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FENCING THE FIFTH AMENDMENT IN
OUR OWN BACKYARD
I. INTRODUCTION
This note will discuss United States v. Gecas,1 in which the
respondent, Gecas, refused to answer certain questions regard-
ing his immigration to the United States, his World War II ac-
tivities in Lithuania and thereby pleaded the Fifth Amendment.
Gecas based his right to remain silent on fear of future foreign
prosecution.2 Consequently, the Florida District Court had to
determine whether fear of foreign prosecution is sufficient to in-
voke the protection of the Fifth Amendment. 3
American courts have looked to English case law to guide
them in dealing with the issue of a defendant's fear of prosecu-
tion, whether such prosecution would be in another court within
the United States or in the court of another country.4 The re-
sult has been that American courts have formulated a two-part
test.5 Initially, the claimant must demonstrate a reasonable
danger of foreign prosecution resulting from being compelled to
testify.6 Only if this showing is sufficient to satisfy the thresh-
old question will a court entertain the issue of extending Fifth
Amendment protection.7
The courts of the United States, which have addressed the
Fifth Amendment question, have reached differing conclusions
on the applicability of the Fifth Amendment to fear of prosecu-
tion in a foreign country. In a recent case, the United States
1 830 F. Supp. 1403 (N.D. Fla. 1993).
2 Id. at 1405.
3 Id. at 1405-06.
4 See Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
5 Gecas, 830 F. Supp. at 1406-07 (citing Zicarelli v. New Jersey State
Comm'n of Investigation, 406 U.S. 472, 478-79 (1972)). This test requires a claim-
ant of the fifth amendment privilege to first satisfy a threshold inquiry before the
court will consider whether to extend constitutional protection. Id.
6 Gecas, 830 F. Supp. at 1406-07.
7 Id. at 1413-14.
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Supreme Court failed to offer a conclusive determination on this
Fifth Amendment question by deciding the case on a sub-issue.8
There is very little United States case law with regard to
the applicability of the Fifth Amendment for fear of prosecution
in a foreign country.9 Therefore, it is necessary to analogize
claims of the Fifth Amendment for fear of foreign prosecution to
claims of the Fifth Amendment for fear of domestic prosecution.
The resolution of the Fifth Amendment question is very impor-
tant because with "increased international cooperation in crime
fighting," it may be likely that more witnesses will plead the
Fifth Amendment for fear of incrimination under the laws of a
foreign nation.10 In Gecas, the Florida District Court for the
Northern District of Florida was presented with an opportunity
to broadly interpret the long-standing, cherished, constitutional
right against self-incrimination, and extend the privilege to fear
of prosecution in a foreign country. However, the Gecas Court
failed to do so."
II. BACKGROUND
A. Origin of the Fifth Amendment
The Fifth Amendment 12 provides that "no person shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against him-
self."' 3 There are differing views as to the origin of the privilege
against self-incrimination. Legal scholars generally agree that
the privilege began as a response to the ex officio or inquisitorial
8 Zicarelli v. New Jersey State Comm'n of Harbor, 406 U.S. 472 (1972). The
court here was faced with the opportunity to decide the issue of whether the fifth
amendment may be invoked where a witness fears a prosecution in a foreign coun-
try. Id.
9 Gecas, 830 F. Supp. at 1414.
10 See Moshe M. Sukenik, Testimony Incriminating Under the Laws of a For-
eign Country-Is There a Right to Remain Silent? 11 N.Y.U. J. INT'L. L. & POL. 359
(1978).
11 Gecas, 830 F. Supp. at 1406.
12 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
13 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 114, at 118 (Edward Cleary ed., 2d ed. 1972)
quoting Stefan A. Riesenfeld, Law-Making and Legislative Precedent in American
Legal History, 33 MINN. L. REV. 103, 118 (1949). Stefan A. Riesenfeld traced the
maxim " 'no man shall be compelled to accuse himself,' to biblical history, specifi-
cally to a statement of Saint Chrysostomous in his commentary to Saint Paul's
Epistle to the Hebrews." Id. The maxim is also found in earliest canonist writings
as "I do not tell you to incriminate yourself publicly or to accuse yourself in front of
others." Id. at 118.
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oath introduced into the English Ecclesiastical Courts in the
thirteenth century. 14 As a result of active interrogation by the
judge, including torture in some cases, a witness testifying
under this oath15 had no choice but to disclose the entire matter
under query.16
In the seventeenth century, the British Parliament passed
a bill prohibiting the administration of the ex officio oath in the
Courts of High Commission and Star Chamber.17 Similarly, in
1641, the ex officio oath was banned in the common law
courts.' 8 The basis underlying this prohibition on the ex officio
oath focused on the difficult and unfair choice that an individual
was forced to make: securing his or her individual liberty or
violating the ex officio oath, thereby incurring penal liability. 19
B. The Right Against Self-Incrimination in the American
Colonies
At the close of the seventeenth century, the privilege
against self-incrimination was "unevenly established in Amer-
ica."20 Evidence of recognition of the privilege in the colonies is
not abundant due to scant trial records. However, in 1756,
Geoffrey Gilbert published Law of Evidence in which he wrote
that a confession must be voluntarily made because "'our law
will not force any man to accuse himself.. .' "21 Several of the
colonies followed English practice closely.22
The English Courts expanded the right against self-incrim-
ination to include the necessity of producing documents that
could inculpate the accused.23 Later, this right was extended to
14 Id. at 244.
15 LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT (1968). The ex officio
oath required the accused, "without having been formally charged with the accusa-
tion against him,. . . or the nature of the evidence against him .... to answer a
series of interrogations whose purpose was to extract a confession." Id. at 368.
16 The oath extended to courts of the High Commission, Star Chamber and
criminal trials. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 13, § 114, at 245-46.
17 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 13, § 114, at 246.
18 8 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2175 at 291 (John T. McNaughton ed., 1961).
19 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 13, § 114, at 247.
20 LEVY, supra note 15, at 368.
21 LEVY, supra note 15, at 371-72.
22 For instance, permitting counsel to the felony defendant only at the discre-
tion of the trial judge and usually on points of law only. LEVY, supra note 15, at
376.
23 LEVY, supra note 15, at 390.
1995]
3
PACE INT'L L. REV.
prohibit the use of general warrants to confiscate private
papers.24 In the 1790's, the opposition to general search war-
rants gave the privilege against self-incrimination added sup-
port, first in England, later in America.25
In 1776, several states converted the common law right
against self-incrimination to a constitutional right.26 At this
time, England and America differed little on the right against
self-incrimination. 27 In sum, "[t]he ever-increasing profession-
alization of the bar, the growing familiarity with 'the liberty of
the subject' and the English rights, and the protests against
self-accusing all contributed to the respectability of the right
against incriminating oneself."28
C. Policy Considerations Underlying the Fifth Amendment
The privilege against self-incrimination promotes respect
for and preserves the "dignity of the judicial system."29 It en-
courages witnesses to testify free from the danger of possible
future punishment.30 In effect, "the privilege removes the in-
centive for perjury."31 More importantly, the privilege insures
that those guilty of a crime are not "compelled to participate in
the establishment of their own guilt."32
Erwin Griswold characterized the privilege as follows:
"The privilege against self-incrimination is one of the greatest
landmark's in man's struggle to make himself civilized...
[thus].. .even the evil man is a human being."33 Above all, the
Fifth Amendment reflected the framers' judgment "that in a
free society, based on respect for the individual, the determina-
tion of guilt or innocence by just procedures, in which the ac-
24 LEVY, supra note 15, at 390.
25 LEVY, supra note 15, at 390.
26 LEVY, supra note 15, at 405.
27 LEVY, supra note 15, at 404.
28 LEVY, supra note 15, at 382.
29 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 13, at 252.
30 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 13, at 252.
31 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 13, at 252.
32 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 13, at 252.
33 ERWIN GRISWOLD, The Fifth Amendment Today, 7-9 (1955). Even the worst
possible criminal is entitled to the protection of his dignity and self-worth in a
civilized society.
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cused made no unwilling contribution to his conviction was
more important than punishing the guilty."3 4
D. Background of Early English Cases
The cases in England, arising before the ratification of the
United States Constitution, show an intention by the English
Courts to acknowledge fear of incrimination claims under other
jurisdictions within England as well as under laws other than
those of the English government. 35 It is from English case law
that American Courts have developed the two part test set out
above.36 To reiterate, the first issue requires the proponent of
the privilege to show a substantial fear of danger if forced to
testify.37 The second issue concerns the scope of the Fifth
Amendment in a foreign jurisdiction which can include another
state or a foreign country.38 Some of these early English cases
discuss both elements of the test, while others address only one.
In 1749, the Court of Exchequer in East India v. Camp-
bell, 39 held that the defendant could invoke the privilege
against self-incrimination where the disclosure of certain infor-
mation might subject him to prosecution in the British colony of
India.40 The defendant claimed that if he disclosed how he ob-
tained possession of certain goods, he would be subject to a for-
eign prosecution in India.41 The court stated the rule as follows:
"this court shall not oblige one to discover that which, if he an-
swers in the affirmative, will subject him to punishment of a
crime,... and it appears that the defendant is punishable in
Calcutta, although not punishable here."42 The Court of Ex-
34 LEw, supra note 15, at 432.
35 Comment, Fear of Foreign Prosecution and the Fifth Amendment, 58 IOWA
L. REV. 1304, 1307 (1973).
36 See supra text accompanying notes 5-7.
37 Gecas, 830 F. Supp. at 1406.
38 Id.
39 27 Eng. Rep. 1010 (Ex. 1749).
40 Id. The defendant, captain of the East India Company's ship, refused to
answer questions as a witness in a criminal suit brought by the Attorney General
in England on charges of fraudulent acquisition of goods found on defendant's ship.
The goods found on the ship were taken from the Indians by violent and fraudulent
means. Id.
41 The prosecution would be for stealing and/or a civil suit brought by the
company for illicit trade in the scope of employment. Id.
42 Id. at 1011. It was of no consequence that if the witness answered in the
negative, no harm would come to him, because according to the Court of Excheq-
1995] 181
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chequer found that the defendant had a reasonable fear and
could invoke the privilege to prevent future prosecution in India
or another court within England. 43
One year later, the Court of Exchequer applied this rule in
Brownsword v. Edwards,44 and permitted the witness to invoke
the right against self-incrimination for fear of future prosecu-
tion in another court in England. In Edwards, the witness de-
clined to answer questions concerning a family estate matter
because doing so could reveal that she married her dead sister's
husband.45 The court noted that to prohibit the plea of self-in-
crimination in this case, they would be affirming the condemned
inquisitorial oath.46 The Court of Exchequer reasoned that in
order for the witness to answer the questions concerning the
family estate, it was necessary for her to reveal her "incestuous
marriage," which would lead to her prosecution.47 According to
the Court of Chancery, the rule against self-incrimination pro-
tected a witness from answering where doing so would subject
the witness to prosecution in any court.48 By upholding the
privilege here, the Court of Exchequer broadly interpreted the
right against self-incrimination by extending the privilege to
protect against future prosecutions in another court.
In 1851, the English Court of Chancery decided another
case concerning the applicability of the right against self-in-
crimination for fear of foreign prosecution. 49 In King of Two
Sicilies v. Willcox, the Court of Chancery held that although the
two defendants feared their answers might subject them to
prosecution in Sicily, they could not invoke the right against
uer, the privilege was intended to protect against penalties in a foreign jurisdic-
tion. Id.
43 Id.
44 28 Eng. Rep. 157 (Ex. 1750).
45 Id. As a result, she could be prosecuted in the ecclesiastical court for enter-
ing into "an incestuous marriage, contrary to law, subject to penalties and punish-
ment." Id.
46 Id. at 158.
47 Id. Moreover, even if the witness received a pardon from the Court of Ex-
chequer, which would prevent her from being prosecuted, the ecclesiastical court
could still prosecute her, notwithstanding the pardon. Id.
48 Id.
49 King of Two Sicilies v. Willcox, 61 Eng. Rep. 116 (Ch. 1851). However, this
court refused to allow the witness to invoke the privilege, indicating division on
this particular issue among different jurisdictions at that time in England.
[Vol. 7:177
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self-incrimination. 50 The two defendants were Italian nationals
sent to Great Britain to act as agents of the revolutionary gov-
ernment in Sicily and purchase a steamship to be used in the
revolution with money collected from war supporters. 5i The de-
fendants entered into a contract with an English ship com-
pany.52 When a contract dispute arose between the company
and the revolutionary government, the Court of Chancery re-
quested that the defendants hand over documents relating to
the purchase of the steamship.53 The two defendants refused,
based on the fear that they would be subjected to punishment in
Sicily under the new government for supporting and aiding the
revolutionary government.5 4 However, the court rejected this
claim.5 5 According to the Court of Chancery in 1851, the right
against self-incrimination was akin to British municipal law
and therefore had jurisdiction exclusively within British bor-
ders, only to those laws made penal by British law, and could
not be applied to protect a defendant when he feared prosecu-
tion in another country. 56 Thus, the Court of Chancery devi-
ated from the position taken by the Court of Exchequer a
century earlier because this court found it impossible to deter-
mine the criminal implications in Italy for treason.57
In 1861, the King's Bench division in England decided a
case involving the right against self-incrimination and formu-
lated the substantial danger part of the test used in United
States v. Gecas. In Queen v. Boyes,58 the court held the witness'
refusal to testify for fear of impeachment by the House of Com-
mons insufficient to invoke the privilege against self incrimina-
tion.59 The court clearly stated that the privilege only applies
50 Id.
51 Id. at 118.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Id. at 124.
55 The Court based its decision on the impossibility of knowing, as a judge, the
criminal implications of specific acts in a foreign nation, and therefore, the judge
could not "form any judgment as to the force or truth of the objection of a witness
when he declines to answer on such ground." Id. at 128.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 121 Eng. Rep. 730 (K.B. 1861).
59 In Boyes, the proponent of the privilege, one of the persons who had knowl-
edge of a bribery, was called to testify as a witness. Id.
1995]
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when, after examining the circumstances of the case and the
evidence compelled, the court determines that the witness has
reasonable grounds to apprehend danger if forced to testify.6 0
The King's Bench Division stated that "[the perceived danger
must be real and appreciable .... not a danger of ordinary and
unsubstantial character .... so improbable that no reasonable
man would suffer it to influence his conduct."61 Applying this
rule, the court found that the witness' fear of subsequent im-
peachment did not rise to the requisite level because the court
granted him a pardon preventing future prosecution in England
and, therefore, the witness could not invoke the privilege.62
In 1867, the position taken by the Court of Chancery in
King of Two Sicilies63 was questioned in United States v. Mc-
Rae.6 4 McRae involved a United States' suit in an English court
for an accounting and payment of moneys claimed by the de-
fendant as a representative for the Confederacy during the Civil
War.65 The defendant asserted that a law had been passed in
the United States allowing the confiscation of the property of all
representatives for the Confederacy, like himself, and if com-
pelled to answer, he would be subjected to this confiscation pro-
ceeding in the United States. 66 The court sustained the claim of
the privilege against self-incrimination and distinguished King
of Two Sicilies by specifically limiting its holding to the facts. 67
The Court of Chancery in McRae68 stated that the judge in Will-
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 730-31. Compare with Brownsword v. Edwards, 28 Eng. Rep. 157,
158 (1750) (where a pardon from any court could not prevent against a future pros-
ecution in an ecclesiastical court for an incestuous marriage).
63 61 Eng. Rep. 116 (Ch. 1851).
64 3 Ch. App. 79 (L.R.-Ch. 1867).
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 McRae, 3 Ch. App. at 85.
68 The court in McRae noted that King of Two Sicilies was distinguishable
because those defendants had not shown that they would be subject to criminal
prosecution in Sicily. In other words, the defendants in King of Two Sicilies failed
to satisfy the substantial and real fear requirement set down by the court in Boyes
in 1861. Id. at 87.
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cox "went beyond the facts of the case and set down an unneces-
sarily broad proposition."69
E. American Case Law
1. Supreme Court
The Supreme Court of the United States has yet to rule on
the issue of whether the Fifth Amendment applies to fear of
prosecution in a foreign country. 70 However, Supreme Court
case law with regard to the Fifth Amendment in general, and
with regard to the substantial fear element, is plentiful.
In 1828, the Supreme Court decided a case concerning fear
of prosecution in another state. In United States v. Saline Bank
of Virginia,71 the United States, seeking to recover bank depos-
its, filed a suit in equity against the cashier of the bank, and a
number of its stockholders. 72 The defendants refused to an-
swer, arguing that their answers would subject them to penal-
ties under a law prohibiting unincorporated banks. 73 In an
unanimous opinion delivered by Chief Justice John Marshall,
the Court decided in favor of the defendants, and held that the
requested information in this case would expose the defendants
to penalties. 74 Further, the Court expressly held that "[t]he
rule clearly is, that a party is not bound to make any discovery
which would expose him to penalties."75 The exact meaning
and extent of the Court's decision in Saline has been disputed.76
69 Id. According to the court in McRae, there were many cases where the
judge could easily discover the foreign penalty, if any, and form a judgment on that
basis. Id.
70 Gecas, 830 F. Supp. at 1406-07.
71 26 U.S. 100 (1828).
72 Id.
73 Id. at 104
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Gecas, 830 F. Supp. at 1415-16. The Florida District Court stated that the
exact basis of the holding in United States v. Saline Bank of Virginia, 26 U.S. 100
(1828), is unclear because the opinion failed to refer to the fifth amendment. The
opinion only refers to what the Saline Court labeled "the rule" and, according to
the Gecas Court, this could mean the rule of the Chancery Courts dealing with the
prohibition against forfeiture. However, in Murphy v. waterfront Com'n, 378
U.S. 52, 59-60 (1964), the Supreme Court categorized Saline as correctly interpret-
ing the fifth amendment. Further, the Court stated that Saline "squarely holds
that the privilege against self-incrimination protects a witness in a federal court
1995]
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The Supreme Court decided the next significant case deal-
ing with the Fifth Amendment in 1896. In Brown v. Walker,77
the Court held that a federal immunity statute prevented prose-
cutions in either state or federal courts.78 The defendant re-
fused to answer questions pertaining to the transportation of
coal on the ground that it could incriminate him under federal
or state law.79 The Court applied a federal immunity statute so
that the defendant was protected from any subsequent prosecu-
tion regarding his testimony.80 The Court held that such an im-
munity statute would serve to protect the witness equally as
well as the Fifth Amendment.81
Brown is significant in many respects. First, the Court ex-
panded the immunity statute to state prosecutions where on its
face, the statute neglected to mention state application.8 2 Sec-
ond, the Court discusses the importance of the Fifth Amend-
ment, a maxim stole from our English brethren and translated
it into American law as an "impregnable constitutional enact-
ment."83 Evidently, the Court stressed the value of the Fifth
Amendment and its safeguarded place in American society. Fi-
nally, although the Court does not address the applicability of
the privilege in a foreign context, in dictum, the Court does
make reference to the English rule of substantial fear estab-
lished in Queen v. Boyes.8 4
Ten years later, the Supreme Court in Ballman v. Fagin,85
upheld the plea of the Fifth Amendment where the witness re-
fused to answer questions regarding his possession of a cash
book ledger which he refused to produce in a federal grand jury
from being compelled to give testimony which could be used against him in a state
court." Id. at 60.
77 161 U.S. 591 (1896).
78 Id. at 606. The defendant, an auditor of a coal company, had been subpoe-
naed as a witness in a suit against certain officers of a company regarding viola-
tions of the Interstate Commerce Act. Id. at 592.
79 Id.
80 The immunity provision dealt with interstate commerce violations. Id. at
593.
81 Id. at 610.
82 Id. at 606.
83 Id. at 597.
84 Id. at 599. According to the Supreme Court in Brown, this rule means that
"the idea against self-incrimination presupposes a legal detriment arising from the
exposure." Id. at 600. See supra notes 55-60 and accompanying text.
85 200 U.S. 186 (1906).
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proceeding.8 6 The witness based his right to invoke the Fifth
Amendment on his fear of state prosecutions already pending
against him.87 The Court relied on United States v. Saline
Bank,88 and accordingly, found the defendant absolved from
testimony which would have exposed him to penalties under
state law.89
Two months later the Supreme Court decided Hale v. Hen-
kel.90 In Hale, the witness, despite having been granted immu-
nity under a federal statute, refused to answer certain
questions for fear of a state prosecution already pending.91 The
Court held that the Fifth Amendment did not apply to the
states, and in any event, the federal immunity statute protected
the defendant. 92 The Court erroneously cited Queen v. Boyes 93
as support for the proposition that the Fifth Amendment ap-
plied within the same jurisdiction. 94 Additionally, the Court
stated that its decision was consistent with United States v. Sa-
line Bank95 because there, the federal government was simply
administering the state law and, therefore, the Court in Saline
86 Id. at 193.
87 Id. at 195.
88 26 U.S. 100 (1828).
89 Ballman, 200 U.S. at 195-96. The Court noted that the cash ledger could
have disclosed defendant's dealings with the suspected parties and could lead to
criminal charges. Id. at 196.
90 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
91 Id. at 44-46. The witness was the treasurer of the defendant tobacco com-
pany. The questions related to violations of the Sherman Act by the company. Id.
92 Id. at 68.
93 121 Eng. Rep 730 (KB. 1861).
94 Hale, 201 U.S. at 68; Queen v. Boyes, 121 Eng. Rep. at 730. Boyes did not
concern the scope of the fifth amendment issue, but rather enunciated the substan-
tial fear test. The substantial fear test was confirmed in later United States
Supreme Court cases. In Mason v. United States, 244 U.S. 362, 366 (1917), the
Court required the witnesses to answer questions during a grand jury investiga-
tion on gambling because the witnesses failed to show real danger if compelled to
testify. The Court cited Boyes, and held "the danger to be apprehended must be
real and appreciable,... a remote and naked possibility, out of the ordinary course
of law and such as no reasonable man would be affected by, should not be suffered
to obstruct the administration of justice." See also Heike v. United States, 227
U.S. 131, 144 (1913) ("The constitutional protection against self-incrimination is
confined to real danger and does not extend to remote possibilities out of the ordi-
nary course of law.").
95 26 U.S. 100 (1828).
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Bank did not rule on the applicability of the Fifth Amendment
in another jurisdiction.9 6
In 1931, the Supreme Court decided United States v. Mur-
dock.97 In Murdock, the defendant refused to answer the sub-
poena of a federal revenue officer concerning deductions made
on his income taxes. 98 The witness refused to answer on the
ground that to do so would incriminate him under state law and
federal law on charges of tax evasion.99 The Court held that the
witness could not fear state prosecution where the crime was of
a federal nature and, nonetheless, the witness had nothing to
fear because he was protected from federal prosecution by an
immunity statute. 100 The Supreme Court in Murdock con-
cluded that the Fifth Amendment offered no protection in a fed-
eral proceeding for fear of incrimination under state laws or
under the laws of another country.10 '
Following Murdock, the Supreme Court restored a broad
interpretation of the Fifth Amendment. 10 2 In Blau v. United
States,10 3 the witness was asked questions in front of a grand
jury concerning her involvement in the Communist Party of
Colorado.10 4 The Court authorized the use of the privilege in
Blau because answers to questions probed by the grand jury
would have furnished a "link in the chain of evidence" needed in
a prosecution of the defendant in federal court. 0 5 The Court
allowed the defendant to invoke the privilege because the fear
that criminal charges might be brought against her if she ad-
96 Hale, 201 U.S. at 69.
97 284 U.S. 141 (1931).
98 Id. at 146.
99 Id. at 147.
100 Id. at 149.
101 Id.
102 See Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479 (1951), where the petitioner
refused to answer certain questions on his current contacts and connections with a
fugitive witness, on the grounds that such testimony would incriminate him under
federal law, the Court upheld the privilege. In doing so, the Court stated: "[the
fifth amendment] must be accorded liberal construction in favor of the right it was
intended to secure." Id. at 486. In addition, the Court in United States v. White,
322 U.S. 694, 698 (1944), stated that: "[tihe immediate and potential evils of com-
pulsory self-disclosure transcend any difficulties that the exercise of the privilege
may impose on society in the detection and prosecution of crime."
103 340 U.S. 159 (1950).
104 Id. at 159-60.
105 Id. at 161. The Court sanctioned the use of the fifth amendment where
compelled testimony could initiate or ensure a criminal prosecution.
[VCol. 7:177
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mitted employment by the Communist Party was "more than a
mere imaginary possibility" in light of the penalties under the
Smith Act. 106 Thus, the Court reaffirmed the "real danger" test
set out in Queen v. Boyes. 10 7
Finally, in the 1960's, the Supreme Court clarified the
scope of the Fifth Amendment under American jurisdiction. In
1964, the Supreme Court decided the landmark case of Murphy
v. Waterfront Comm'n of New York.' 08 In Murphy, although
granted state immunity, the defendants refused to testify on the
ground that it would incriminate them under federal law.'0 9
Thus, the Court faced the same issue presented many times
before: whether the Fifth Amendment protects against fear of
prosecution in another jurisdiction within the United States.1 0
The Supreme Court in Murphy answered this issue affirm-
atively. Specifically, the Court held that the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination had no jurisdictional limita-
tion under American law; it protected "a state witness against
incrimination under federal law as well as state law, and a fed-
eral witness against incrimination under state as well as fed-
eral law."1 1'
Murphy is a momentous decision for numerous reasons.
First, the Murphy Court affirmed that the privilege protects
against, inter alia, "the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, per-
jury and contempt."" 2 Second, the Murphy Court declared the
rule, set out in United States v. McRae," 3 as the "real English
rule," and interpreted McRae as permitting a witness to invoke
the privilege for fear of foreign prosecution." 4 Third, the Mur-
phy Court interpreted United States v. Saline Bank of Vir-
ginia,115 as sanctioning recourse to the Fifth Amendment where
106 Id.
107 121 Eng. Rep. 730 (KLB. 1861).
108 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
109 The witnesses here were subpoenaed to testify before the Waterfront
Comm'n of New York Harbor relating to work stoppages. Id. at 53.
110 Aside from the two cases United States v. Saline Bank of Virginia, 26 U.S.
100 (1828) and Ballman v. Fagin, 200 U.S. 186 (1906), the Supreme Court never
extended the privilege outside federal jurisdiction.
111 Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 78 (1964).
112 Id. at 55.
113 3 Ch. App. 79 (L.R.-Ch. 1867).
114 Murphy, 378 U.S. at 63.
115 26 U.S. 100 (1828).
1995]
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the defendant feared foreign prosecution, 116 putting to rest the
question that had previously been interpreted differently by the
Supreme Court.117 Finally, the Murphy Court cited the sub-
stantial fear test from Queen v. Boyes," 8 thereby mandating its
use by the courts.
In 1972, the Supreme Court was presented with the ques-
tion of the Fifth Amendment's applicability, only this time, in a
foreign country. In Zicarelli v. New Jersey State Comm'n of In-
vestigation,1 9 the Court found it unnecessary to reach the issue
of whether an individual could assert the Fifth Amendment for
fear of a prosecution in a foreign country because the Court
found that the danger of such prosecution was remote. 120 The
defendant refused to answer questions relating to secret crime
organizations asserting that these answers could expose him to
foreign prosecution in Venezuela.' 2 '
The Supreme Court in Zicarelli stated that the privilege
protects against only "real dangers," not remote and speculative
possibilities, 22 akin to the standard set out by the King's Bench
in Queen v. Boyes.' 23 In Zicarelli, 24 the Court found that the
defendant did not have a substantial danger of foreign prosecu-
tion in another country because the questions the defendant ob-
jected to focused only on activities in the New Jersey area, and
did not encompass foreign involvements. 25 The Court con-
cluded that because the defendant failed to satisfy the "real
danger" test, it was unnecessary to reach the constitutional
116 Murphy, 378 U.S. at 60.
117 See supra text accompanying notes 61-66.
118 Murphy, 378 at 67-68.
119 406 U.S. 472 (1972).
120 Id. at 480. Zicarelli involved a defendant accused of organized crime and
political corruption in New Jersey who was labeled by newspapers as a "foremost
internationalist" in organized crime because of his alleged participation in unlaw-
ful endeavors in Canada and the Dominican Republic. Id. at 479.
121 Id. at 479-80.
122 Id. at 478.
123 121 Eng. Rep. 730 (KB. 1861).
124 Zicarelli, 406 U.S. at 480. When considering a fifth amendment claim, the
appropriate task of the court is to focus on what a truthful answer might disclose.
Id.
125 Id. at 479.
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question.126 Therefore, the Supreme Court has not conclusively
determined the scope of the Fifth Amendment. 127
2. Federal Court of Appeals
The few federal courts that have addressed the constitu-
tional question at bar have not conclusively answered the ques-
tion of extending the Fifth Amendment privilege. Two Courts of
Appeal have expressly held that the privilege does not apply,
while one found the witness' fear remote, 128 and others disposed
of the case on other grounds. In In Re Parker,129 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held the defend-
ant in contempt for refusing to answer questions for fear of
prosecution in Canada.130 The court based its holding on the
remoteness of foreign prosecution and the adequacy of Federal
Rule 6(e), which prevents disclosure of grand jury testimony.13 1
However, the Court of Appeals went further and simply
concluded, without engaging in any analysis, 132 that the Fifth
Amendment does not apply to acts made criminal by a foreign
nation. 133
In United States v. Flanagan,134 the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit denied the defendant the use of the Fifth
Amendment after he refused to testify under a grant of immu-
126 Id. at 478.
127 Gecas, 830 F. Supp. at 1406-07.
128 See United States v. Yanagita, 552 F.2d 940 (2d Cir. 1977); see also United
States v. Flanagan, 691 F.2d 116 (2d Cir. 1982).
129 411 F.2d 1067 (10th Cir. 1969).
130 The questions were concerning alleged violations of 18 U.S.C. § 2153 such
as sabotage, and destruction of war materials. Id. at 1068.
131 Federal Rule 6(e) reads: "[A] juror, attorney, interpreter, stenographer, op-
erator of a recording device, or any typist who transcribes recorded testimony may
disclose matters occurring before the grand jury only when so directed by the court
preliminarily to or in connection with a judicial proceeding or when permitted by
the court at the request of the defendant upon a showing that grounds may exist
for a motion to dismiss the indictment because of matters occurring before the
grand jury." Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e). Parker, 411 F.2d at 1070.
132 Gecas, 830 F. Supp. at 1414.
133 Parker, 411 F.2d at 1070. Other circuits have held that the grand jury se-
crecy rule eliminates the danger of foreign incrimination. E.g., In Re Baird, 668
F.2d 432 (8th Cir.); cert. denied, 456 U.S. 982 (1982); U.S. v. Smith, 628 F.2d 1260
(9th Cir. 1980); In Re Brummit, 613 F.2d. 62 (5th Cir.); cert. denied, 447 U.S. 907
(1980); United States v. Lemieux, 597 F.2d 1166 (9th Cir. 1979).
134 691 F.2d 116 (2d Cir. 1982).
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nity before a federal grand jury. 13 5 The court enunciated spe-
cific factors to assess in determining the danger of foreign
prosecution:
whether there is an existing or potential foreign prosecution of
defendant, what foreign charges could be filed against him,
whether prosecution of the individual would be initiated or fur-
thered by his testimony, whether any such charges would entitle
the foreign jurisdiction to have him extradited from the United
States, and whether there is a likelihood that his testimony given
here would be disclosed to the foreign government. 136
The Second Circuit found that the danger of foreign prose-
cution was remote and speculative because the questions asked
of the witness all involved activities within the United States
and there were no pending or prospective prosecutions of the
witness in England or Ireland. 13 7 The court concluded that in
the absence of a specific showing of probable foreign prosecution
where a grant of immunity has been extended to the witness,
"the witness granted immunity could use the privilege as a vir-
tual license to frustrate almost any criminal investigation hav-
ing international consequences, however peripheral or tan-
gential.' 38
In 1986, a third federal court case, United States v.
Araneta, 39 held that the Fifth Amendment did not apply to fear
of a prosecution in the Philippines.140 The United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit ordered the defendants, the
daughter and son-in-law of Ferdinand Marcos, to testify on is-
sues involving corruption in arms contracts with the Philip-
pines. 14 ' Although the court found the defendant's fear of a
future prosecution in the Philippines real and substantial,1 42 it
concluded that the privilege applies only where the sovereign
compelling the testimony and the sovereign using the testimony
135 The defendant was a dual citizen of the United States and Great Britain.
The questions were concerning the smuggling of guns and ammunition from the
United States to Great Britain and Ireland. Id. at 117.
136 Id. at 121.
137 Id. at 122.
138 Id. at 121.
139 794 F.2d 920 (4th Cir. 1986).
140 Id. at 926.
141 Id. at 921.
142 Id. at 924.
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are bound by the Fifth Amendment.143 Since the Fifth Amend-
ment would not impair the use of incriminating testimony in
their court, the Fifth Amendment offered no protection to a wit-
ness fearing prosecution in the Philippines.'"
3. District Courts
Numerous district courts have addressed this constitu-
tional question and have held the Fifth Amendment applicable
for fear of foreign prosecution. 146 However, the Florida District
Court for Northern District of Florida has not yet ruled on this
issue.146
In United States v. Trucis,147 the Pennsylvania District
Court permitted the witness to invoke the Fifth Amendment for
failure to answer biographical questions regarding his immigra-
tion application.148 The court concluded that the witness had a
real fear of foreign prosecution for war crimes if he were de-
ported out of the United States.149 The court cited Murphy v.
New York Waterfront Comm'n,150 to support the proposition
that English case law afforded protection beyond the question-
ing jurisdiction.151
Similarly, in United States v. Edgars Inde,152 the Minne-
sota District Court upheld the use of the Fifth Amendment
where the witness refused to answer questions about his immi-
gration application, and refused to produce documents attesting
143 Id. at 926.
144 Id. The Court of Appeals stressed the sovereignty of the two countries and
the need to respect the independence of the laws of other nations. Id. at 926.
145 E.g. Mishima v. United States, 507 F. Supp. 131 (D. Alaska 1981); In re
Cardissi, 351 F. Supp. 1080 (D. Conn. 1972); United States v. Kowalchuk, Case
No. 77-118 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 20, 1978).
146 Gecas, 830 F. Supp. at 1406-07.
147 89 F.R.D. 671 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
148 Id. at 672. The witness here is a naturalized citizen originally from Latvia.
The questions asked focused on the possibility that the defendant knowingly con-
cealed facts showing his participation in persecution of Jews during 1941-43. Id.
at 672.
149 Id. at 673.
150 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
151 United States v. Trucis, 89 F.R.D. 671, 673 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
152 No. 3-88-0570, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18388, at *1 (D. Minn. Aug. 22,
1989).
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to his biographical information. 153 In its opinion, the court first
applied the "real danger" test set out in Zicarelli v. New Jersey
State Comm'n of Investigation.154 The witness easily satisfied
this test because if the witness was denaturalized, he would be
deported and may be prosecuted for war crimes in Israel, West
Germany, or Russia based on the evidence against him. 155 The
Inde Court held the Fifth Amendment applicable after distin-
guishing the relevant Circuit Court cases, 15 6 which held that
the Fifth Amendment did not apply to fear of foreign prosecu-
tion. The Inde Court further reasoned that a federal court is
not vested with the power to compel an American citizen to tes-
tify on matters which could subject him to a foreign prosecu-
tion.157 It was against this background that the Florida District
Court in United States v. Gecas,158 had to decide whether the
Fifth Amendment applied where the witness fears prosecution
in a foreign sovereign.
III. UNIrD STATES V. GECAS, 830 F. Supp. 1403
(N.D. FLA., 1993).
A. Facts
In September 1991, the United States, through its Office of
Special Investigations (hereinafter "OSI"), 15 9 commanded the
respondent, a Lithuanian national residing in Florida, to give
testimony and to produce documents concerning his immigra-
153 Id. at *1-2. The government believed that the witness, Inde, assisted the
Nazis in the persecution of Jews during the Nazi occupation of Latvia. Id.
154 Id. at 5; see supra text at 5-8.
155 United States v. Inde, No. 3-88-5070, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18388, at *10
(D. Minn. Aug. 22, 1993).
156 See supra text accompanying notes 133-49.
157 Inde, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18388, at *17. If so, the whole purpose of the
fifth amendment would be undermined: the right to refuse to answer on the
grounds that it would lead to prosecution.
158 Gecas, 830 F. Supp. 1403.
159 The Office of Special Investigations is a branch of the Criminal Division in
the United States Department of Justice created by the Attorney General in 1979.
OSI's chief responsibility is to investigate, and where proper, deport, denaturalize,
or prosecute any naturalized citizen who assisted the Nazis by persecuting any
person because of race, religion, political opinion, or natural origin. Gecas, 830 F.
Supp. at 1405. Although the United States has no specific law for prosecuting for-
mer Nazis for crimes committed against non-Americans outside American soil, the
OSI was created to aid investigations of these criminals. Stuart Taylor, Steps to
Deport Nazi Backers Cause Legal Concern, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 1983, at 17.
[Vol. 7:177
18http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol7/iss1/6
19951 FENCING THE FIFTH AMENDMENT
tion to the United States and his wartime activities 60 in Eu-
rope between 1941-1945.161 The respondent, Vytautas Gecas
entered the United States on October 23, 1962 via the Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Act of 1952.162 Gecas stated on his ap-
plication for an Immigrant Visa that during the years in
question, he attended school in Lithuania. 163
Gecas refused to answer questions concerning bibliographi-
cal information, his associations with various organizations
during the war, and his knowledge of the treatment of Jews in
Lithuania after the Nazi occupation. 64 He based his refusal to
respond to these questions on the Fifth Amendment. 65 Gecas
based his right to remain silent on the fear of future foreign
prosecution.166
In opposition, the United States argued that fear of foreign
prosecution is not sufficient to invoke the protection of the Fifth
Amendment. 167 In the alternative, the United States argued
that Gecas' fear of foreign prosecution was not real enough to
160 See Ethan Bronner, Some Fear Demanjuk Ruling Opens Door To Doubt;
Nazi Hunters See Peril To Pursuit, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 1, 1993, at 16. The
Wiesenthal Center has commenced "Operation: Final Justice," a two year joint
mission based in Vilnius, Lithuania, to locate Nazi sympathizers of Eastern Euro-
pean origin. Efraim Zuroff, a Jerusalem-based worldwide coordinator of Nazi re-
search for the Center observed that the break-up of the Soviet Union has aided
this search. "There are thousands of documents, lists of police chiefs and collabo-
rators with dates and specifics and each case can lead to others." Id. see also Na-
tional Briefs, THE Hous. CHRON., Aug. 27, 1993, at 10. "The Justice Department
and the Ukrainian government formally agreed to cooperate in the investigation of
Nazi war criminals. Like similar agreements signed during the last year by Latvia
and Lithuania, it replaces an earlier accord signed by the United States and offi-
cials of the former Soviet Union." Id.
161 Gecas, 830 F. Supp. at 1405. After receiving certain records from the
archives in the capitals of the former Soviet Union, OSI suspected that Gecas may
have lied about his wartime activities. Id. at 1405-06.
162 Id.
163 Id.
164 Id. at 1406. When Gecas and his attorney appeared in the District Court on
September 12, 1991, the respondent stated his name and current, as well as imme-
diate, past addresses, but the information sought included his date of birth, and
his residence during the war. Id.
165 Id. at 1406.
166 Id. at 1405. Although the witness faced no risk of prosecution in the United
States aside from deportation, Gecas argued that the answers to the previous
questions accompanied with the requested documents would expose him to prose-
cution in Germany, Israel, Lithuania, and Belarus. Id. at 1408.
167 Id. at 1406.
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trigger the shield of the Fifth Amendment. 168 Consequently,
the Florida District Court had to determine whether fear of for-
eign prosecution was sufficient to invoke the Fifth Amendment,
and whether Gecas' fear of such foreign prosecution was real
and substantial.169
B. Holding
The Gecas Court noted that neither the Supreme Court nor
the Eleventh Circuit had offered a conclusive determination on
this Fifth Amendment question. 170 In addition, the Court rec-
ognized that of the few lower courts that have answered the
Fifth Amendment question, none have provided a clear analy-
sis. 17 1 The court decided that Gecas' fear of prosecution in Ger-
many, Israel, and Lithuania was substantial and real. 172
In addressing the constitutional question, the court in Ge-
cas, carved out a narrower question: "whether the Fifth Amend-
ment privilege is a personal 'right' designed to secure the
168 Id.
169 Id. at 1406.
170 Id. at 1406-07.
171 Id. at 1414.
172 The court recognized that all three of these sovereigns have laws under
which they could prosecute Gecas for war crimes. However, the court found his
fear of prosecution in Belarus, (a former Soviet Republic) insubstantial because of
the precarious status of what is currently the Soviet Union. Id. at 17. Israel's
"Nazi and Nazi Collaborators" statute is as follows: A crime against the Jewish
People means any of the following acts, committed with intent to destroy the Jew-
ish people in whole or in part:
"1) killing Jews;
2) causing serious bodily or mental harm to Jews;
3) placing Jews in living conditions calculated to bring about their physical
destruction;
4) imposing measures intended to prevent birth among Jews;
5) forcibly transferring Jewish children to another national or religious group;
6) destroying or desecrating Jewish religious or cultural assets or values;
7) inciting to hatred of Jews."
In addition, Gecas could be prosecuted under Germany's murder statute which
provides:
"1) a murderer shall be punished by imprisonment for life.
2) a murder is a person who kills another person from thirst for blood, satisfaction
of his sexual desires, avarice or other base motives in a malicious or brutal manner
or one dangerous to public safety or in order to permit the commission or conceal-
ment of another criminal act." Finally, Gecas could be prosecuted under a recently
enacted statute making "[glenocide, murder, torture, execution and deportation of
Lithuanian people during the period of Nazi occupation a crime. Id. at 1409.
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dignity of the individual against invasion by the government, or
a restraint aimed at particular abuses of the government's
power."173 The court found the Fifth Amendment is intended to
regulate the actions of the United States, rather than to bestow
a personal right on all individuals. 174 Since the Fifth Amend-
ment does not extend to foreign governments, witnesses cannot
invoke it where their basis is fear of foreign prosecution. 175
Consequently, the court granted the United States' motion to
enforce its subpoena compelling the witness to testify and pro-
duce the requested documents. 176
C. The Court's Reasoning
1. Limited Scope of the Privilege
The Florida District Court interpreted the Fifth Amend-
ment as solely intended to regulate the actions of the United
States Government, and not as a personal right bestowed upon
American citizens. 177 The Fifth Amendment serves this regula-
tory function in two ways. First, it prevents inhumane treat-
ment of any witnesses subpoenaed to testify.178 Second, "it
provides a fair state-individual balance by forcing the govern-
ment to leave the individual alone until good cause is otherwise
shown." 179
The Gecas Court, relying on the history of the right against
self-incrimination in English case law, concluded that the Fifth
Amendment is but an instrument to keep the federal as well as
each state government from abusing its power.' 8 0 The court
further held that the Fifth Amendment evolved as it is today to
protect against the procedural abuses created by the ex officio
173 Id. at 1414-15.
174 Id. at 1421-22.
175 Id. at 1422.
176 Id. at 1423.
177 Id. at 1421-22.
178 Id.
179 Id. The Gecas Court recognized these purposes of the fifth amendment dis-
cussed by the Supreme Court in Murphy.
150 This reliance on English case law focuses specifically on the development of
the privilege to protest the condemned ex officio oath. Id. at 1422.
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oath,' 8 ' and is an "improvement" to these condemned proce-
dural abuses of the thirteenth century. 182
2. Flooding the Gates
The court in Gecas opined that if the Fifth Amendment ap-
plied in cases where an individual had fear of foreign prosecu-
tion, many could invoke the privilege. The court based this
conclusion on the fact that almost every act is criminal some-
where in the world today. 1 3 The Gecas Court believed it would
not be difficult for an individual to prove a realistic fear of pros-
ecution in a foreign sovereign, especially with modern, wide-
spread, international travel. 8 4
3. Significance of Domestic Law Enforcement
The Florida District Court refused to extend the privilege
because the court feared that such an extension would "erode
domestic law enforcement." 8 5 If the privilege were extended,
the court compelling the testimony could not act without exam-
ining foreign law, in which case American law would be some-
what dependent on foreign law. 18 6
The court in Gecas relied on the holding in United States v.
Araneta.8 7 There, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
refused to extend the privilege primarily because such an ex-
pansion could conceivably lead to a situation where the United
States would have no choice but to forego vital evidence and
hinder an investigation because the foreign power could later
use the evidence in a prosecution against the witness.' 88 Ac-
cording to the court, if it were to expand the protection of the
Fifth Amendment, our own sovereignty and laws would depend
on the actions of foreign governments.'8 9 Presumably, if the
court in Gecas were to permit the witness to invoke the Fifth
181 Id.
182 Id.
183 Id. at 1422.
184 Id.
185 Id. at 1422.
186 Id. For example, such an extension could erode the granting of immunity
in exchange for testimony. Id. at 1422.
187 794 F.2d 920 (4th Cir. 1986).
188 Id. at 926.
189 Id.
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Amendment because Israel, Germany, or Lithuania could use
the evidence against him in a subsequent criminal trial, the in-
vestigation concerning Gecas' visa application would be seri-
ously impeded.
4. Expansion of Fifth Amendment Undermines Policy of Fifth
Amendment
Ultimately, the Florida District Court refused to extend the
Fifth Amendment because if it were extended to apply where a
witness fears foreign prosecution, American procedures in en-
forcing the law would not be any more effective or humane. 190
The court declared in that situation, the purpose in invoking
the privilege would be to give the witness an extra "benefit,"
rather than to enforce American domestic law.191 The Gecas
Court reiterated that the sole purpose of the Fifth Amendment
is to protect against abuses by American federal and state gov-
ernments. 192 The Fifth Amendment is unique to American ju-
risprudence and, therefore, it does not affect foreign govern-
ments. 193 Since the Fifth Amendment does not prohibit the use
of compelled testimony in a foreign court, it cannot give the wit-
ness any privilege to refrain from testifying before a United
States Court based on fear of foreign prosecution.1 94
D. Analysis of the Court's Decision
1. Fifth Amendment "Broadly" Interpreted
The Gecas Court claims to construe the Fifth Amendment
broadly. The court states that the privilege extends to testi-
mony that would "furnish a link in the chain of evidence"
needed to prosecute the witness for a crime. 195 The court also
string cites numerous cases in which the privilege is given a
broad interpretation but declines to discuss them further.196
These cases are crucial to an historical understanding of the
190 Gecas, 830 F. Supp at 1422-23.
191 Id. at 1422.
192 Id. at 1423.
193 Id. at 1422.
194 Id. at 1422-23.
195 Id. at 1415.
196 Id.
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Fifth Amendment. 197 The Fifth Amendment has been inter-
preted broadly by the Supreme Court and it has been extended
to protect: a witness in civil proceedings;' 98 a state witness
against incrimination under federal law as well as state law
and vice versa;199 resident aliens in the United States;200 and
even to workers questioned about their job performance. 20 1 The
Florida District Court concedes that these cases have inter-
preted the Fifth Amendment broadly, yet its decision fails to
substantially incorporate them into its analysis.
By ultimately finding that the Fifth Amendment is not a
personal right conferred upon persons within the protection of
American law, the court undermines the history and broad in-
terpretation of the Fifth Amendment with regard to American
citizens. 20 2 The Fifth Amendment is a constitutional protection
safeguarded by an individual in American society.203 The fram-
ers of the United States Constitution considered the Fifth
Amendment so vital to American law that it was put into the
Bill of Rights. 20 4 By narrowly defining its scope, the Florida
197 See McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34 (1924), where the Court held that
the fifth amendment applies in a civil proceeding as well as a criminal proceeding.
"The privilege is not ordinarily dependent upon the nature of the proceeding in
which the testimony is sought or is to be used. It applies alike to civil and criminal
proceedings, wherever the answer might tend to subject to criminal responsibility
him who gives it." Id. at 40. See also Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228
(1896), (resident aliens also enjoy the fifth amendment privilege).
198 McCarthy, 266 U.S. 34, 40 (1924).
199 Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 77-78 (1964).
200 Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896).
201 Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70 (1973). Two architects refused to sign
waivers of the fifth amendment when they were asked questions pertaining to
their job performance before a grand jury investigating charges of conspiracy, lar-
ceny and bribery. "A witness protected by the privilege may rightfully refuse to
answer unless and until he is protected at least against the use of his compelled
answers and evidence derived therefrom in any subsequent criminal case in which
he is a defendant." Id. at 77.
202 See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950). (the Supreme Court re-
fused to extend the fifth amendment privilege to enemy German aliens captured in
China and tried by an American Military Commission in China for violations of the
laws of war.). Indeed, the Court specifically stated that an alien resident's pres-
ence within the territorial jurisdiction enables the judiciary to act in affording the
"alien" constitutional protection. Id. at 771.
203 See United States v. Trucis, 89 F.R.D. 671, 673 (D.Minn. 1981) ("The privi-
lege is not simply a limit on the activities of American courts and law-enforcement
authorities: it is a freedom conferred upon persons within the protection of Ameri-
can law.").
204 Sukenik, supra note 10, at 359.
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District Court does injustice to the purpose of the Fifth Amend-
ment and the fundamental protection it provides.
2. English Law Neglected
The Gecas205 Court did not find English precedent persua-
sive even though the Supreme Court did in Murphy v. New York
Waterfront Comm'n.20 6 The court relied on a recommendation
of the British Law Reform Committee made to the British Par-
liament in 1967 that the privilege be limited to domestic incrim-
ination.20 7 However, the Florida Court neglects the importance
of Supreme Court's approval of the broad interpretation of the
Fifth Amendment. The Supreme Court's decision in Murphy is
the last word on this issue aside from Zicarelli v. New Jersey
State Commn of Investigation.20 8
3. Fifth Amendment Not Applicable in Foreign Nations
In addition, the Gecas Court minimizes the importance of
two Supreme Court cases when it states that except for the "un-
clear" exceptions of United States v. Saline Bank of Virginia20 9
and Ballman v. Fagin,210 the Supreme Court has never sanc-
tioned recourse to the Fifth Amendment where the witness
feared prosecution by a sovereign state that was not itself
bound by the Fifth Amendment. 211 However, the Supreme
Court consistently cites these cases with approval in subse-
quent decisions.212 It is incomprehensible that they should now
be regarded as "ambiguous" and uncontrolling.
205 830 F. Supp. 1403.
206 478 U.S. at 77 ("[iun light of the history, policies and purposes of the privi-
lege against self-incrimination, we now accept as correct the construction given the
privilege by the English Courts and Chief Justice Marshall and Justice Holmes.").
207 Gecas, 830 F. Supp. at 1418. This recommendation was subsequently
passed into law in Great Britain in 1968. Id.
208 In Zicarelli v. New Jersey State Comm'n of Investigation, 406 U.S. 472
(1972), the Court did not find the witness' fear of foreign prosecution real or sub-
stantial, and therefore, did not reach the constitutional question. Id. at 478.
209 26 U.S. 100 (1828).
210 200 U.S. 186 (1906).
211 Gecas, 830 F. Supp. at 1421-22.
212 See Murphy, 378 U.S. at 60.
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4. Flooding the Gates Unlikely
The Gecas Court's fear that extending the privilege could
lead to numerous pleas of the Fifth Amendment based on fear of
foreign prosecution is premature. Historically, a witness could
not invoke the Fifth Amendment on the sole basis that the de-
sired testimony would incriminate himself. On the contrary, ac-
cording to the Supreme Court in Zicarelli, a witness must show
a tangible fear before invoking the Fifth Amendment. 213
The court erroneously contends that an individual could
easily show a reasonable fear of foreign prosecution based on
modern, widespread, international travel.214 American courts,
under the guidance of the Supreme Court, have always required
a witness to show substantial fear, and a dubious fear of danger
has never been sufficient to invoke the shield of the Fifth
Amendment. 215 This substantial danger standard is not easily
satisfied and is for the court to determine not from the witness'
point of view, but from an objective, reasonable person
standpoint.216
5. District Cases on Point Ignored
The court in Gecas acknowledges similar district court
cases that apply the Fifth Amendment based on fear of a foreign
prosecution by string citing them.21 7 Although not bound by
these decisions, the court here failed to discuss their relevance.
The Gecas Court relies heavily on the Courts of Appeals cases
but only mentions, without discussing in detail, some state
court cases with similar fact patterns that have dealt with this
Fifth Amendment issue.
213 406 U.S. 472, 478 (1972).
214 Gecas, 830 F. Supp. at 1422.
215 See U.S. v. Flanagan, 691 F.2d 116, 121-22 (2d Cir. 1982) (the witness' fear
of a foreign prosecution if compelled to testify remote and speculative, even though
he was a dual citizen of the United States and Ireland and a member of the Irish
Republican Army because the foreign countries, Northern Ireland and Ireland had
not begun a prospective prosecution and the questions asked relate to activities
solely in the United States); see supra text accompanying notes 138-42.
216 Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951) (quoting Rogers v.
United States, 340 U.S. 367 (1951)) ("The witness is not exonerated from answer-
ing merely because he declares that in so doing he would incriminate himself-his
say-so does not of itself establish the hazard of incrimination. It is for the court to
say whether his silence is justified.").
217 Gecas, 830 F. Supp. at 1414.
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One such district court case is United States v. Inde.218
Inde shares many similarities with the Gecas case.2 19 In both
cases, the respective courts considered the possibility that the
witness covered up his wartime location and activities, 220 which
could lead to denaturalization, and ultimately, deportation.221
Both of these individuals were of Eastern European origin and
both were suspected of persecuting Jews during World War
11.222
Both courts discussed federal case law. The Minnesota Dis-
trict Court carefully distinguished these cases.223 There, the
Court noted that Inde's refusal to testify could only interfere
with his criminal investigation, not the criminal investigation of
another.224 Therefore, in United States v. Flanagan,225 the
grant of immunity, which would sufficiently protect the witness
from future prosecution, coupled with the witness' insubstantial
fear of foreign prosecution, erased the need for Fifth Amend-
ment protection. In contrast, in Inde, the witness could not be
protected in his own proceeding without the Fifth Amendment
since he had a substantial fear of a foreign prosecution.226 Sim-
ilarly, the defendant's refusal to testify in Gecas227 will not af-
fect any other domestic criminal investigation, aside from his
own.
Additionally, the Inde Court correctly distinguished the
Federal Court of Appeals case Araneta v. United States.228
218 No. 3-88-0570, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18388 (D. Minn. Aug. 22, 1993).
219 In Inde, the Minnesota District Court, as did the Florida District Court in
Gecas, questioned the witness' immigration status.
220 Gecas, 830 F. Supp. at 1405; Inde, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18388, at *1-2.
221 See United States v. Fedorenko, 449 U.S. 490 (1981). For a court to denatu-
ralize a citizen, "at the very least, a misrepresentation must be considered mate-
rial if disclosure of the true facts would have made the applicant ineligible to
maintain a visa." Id. at 509.
222 Gecas, 830 F. Supp. at 1405; Inde, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18388, at *1-2.
223 Inde, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18388, at *7. For example, the Minnesota Dis-
trict Court noted that in United States v. Flanagan, 691 F.2d 116 (2d Cir. 1982),
the witness, having been asked to testify against others, was granted immunity
coextensive with the fifth amendment, and the Court of Appeals realized that in-
voking the fifth amendment in that situation would only "frustrate a criminal in-
vestigation having international consequences."
224 Id. at *9.
225 691 F.2d 116 (2d Cir. 1982).
226 Inde, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18388, at *9.
227 830 F. Supp. at 1403.
228 794 F. 2d 920 (4th Cir. 1986).
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First, the witnesses in Araneta were citizens of the Philippines
and were already involved in an investigation in that coun-
try.2 2 9 If the United States permitted the invocation of the
Fifth Amendment, it would be interfering with an investigation
concerning citizens of a foreign country.230 However, the court
in Inde noted that the defendant was a naturalized citizen of
the United States with all the correlative rights and privi-
leges.231 In this area, aliens are not granted the same rights
and privileges as citizens.232 The Minnesota District Court
noted that refusing to interfere with a foreign government's in-
vestigation is very different from a "federal court using its judi-
cial power to compel an American citizen to testify on matters
which may well subject him to foreign prosecution." 233 Simi-
larly, Gecas is a naturalized American citizen with all the rights
and privileges given to citizens. He is entitled to the protection
of the Fifth Amendment while testifying on American soil, in an
American Court, and in front of American Justice Officials. Ge-
cas cannot, and should not be compared to citizens of the Philip-
pines or U.S. citizens testifying in a domestic criminal investi-
gation. United States v. GecaS234 should be examined in rela-
tion to those cases that are similarly situated, not those that are
entirely distinct. In addition, the Florida District Court should
have applied the Fifth Amendment to a United States citizen as
the amendment has been applied throughout its history,
broadly.
IV. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the Florida District Court for the Northern
District of Florida erroneously decided United States v. Gecas in
light of the history and policy of the Fifth Amendment. The
court neglects to address in detail, district court cases with facts
229 Id. at 1301.
230 Inde, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11954, at *17
231 Id.
232 See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950). The fifth amendment can-
not apply extra-territorially (to aliens) for if "[s]uch exterritorial application of or-
ganic law would have been so significant an innovation in the practice of
governments that, if intended or apprehended, it could scarcely have failed to ex-
cite contemporary comment." Id.
233 Inde, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18388, at *17.
234 830 F. Supp. 1403.
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substantially similar to the facts in United States v. Gecas, and
relies on arguments from federal court of appeals cases which
are clearly distinguishable. Moreover, the court undermines
the policy and the purpose of the Fifth Amendment by defining
it solely as a limit on federal and state governmental power.
Throughout history, as demonstrated by the origin of the Fifth
Amendment as well as American case law, the Fifth Amend-
ment has been interpreted to bestow a right on a United States
citizen where the citizen shows a substantial danger of prosecu-
tion if forced to testify. The holding in United States v. Gecas
denigrates the significance of the Fifth Amendment as a right
protected under the United States Constitution.
Christine L. Reimann*
* The author wishes to dedicate this article to her family, Manfred, Marilyn,
Susan and Jennifer Reimann.
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